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Abstract
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career
paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher
office in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative
behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group-leadership
votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of suprana-
tional institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national level vari-
ables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test
the argument, we analyze MEPs’ roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the
EP (1999-2004) using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting
behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes.
∗We thank Brian Gaines, Jude Hays, Robert Pahre, Kevin Quinn, Tom Rudolph, and Guy
Whitten for helpful assistance. We also acknowledge the funding support of the European
Union Center at the University of Illinois.
1
Politicians are ambitious. Some legislators wish to remain in their current positions for
multiple terms, others aspire to other offices, and still others expect to serve in politics for
only a short time (Schlesinger 1966). Those career ambitions shape behavior. A legislator’s
expectations about future office affect the choices she makes while serving in her current
position (Hibbing 1986). Demonstrating empirical support for the importance of political
ambition, however, is not straightforward. While research has focused on behavior across
legislatures with a variety of career ladders (see e.g. Black 1972, Rhode 1979, Epstein, Brady,
Kawato & O’Halloran 1997, Samuels 2003), those studies center on a single country, limiting
the possible variation in career-oriented behavior. Since only a small number of other posi-
tions are likely to arouse the ambitions of serving legislators, it is difficult to disentangle how
the characteristics of the legislature, its members, and the opportunity structure interact to
influence legislative behavior.1
We take advantage of a unique institutional laboratory to investigate how ambition af-
fects vote choice: the European Parliament (EP). The EP houses politicians from all member
states of the European Union (EU), each with a different set of national political institutions,
party systems, and political opportunity structures. Members of the European Parliament
(MEP) typically follow one of two career paths (Stolz 2001, Scarrow 1997). Some MEPs pre-
fer to advance within the EP itself, gaining seniority and access to key leadership positions.
Other MEPs view their time in the EP as a valuable stepping-stone to higher office in their
home state. We argue that these different career ambitions condition legislative behavior
within the EP. Those MEPs seeking to remain in the EP further their careers by pleasing
EP group leaders and will work to expand the authority of Europe’s supranational institu-
tions relative to member-state governments. MEPs expecting to return to domestic political
positions, in contrast, have less reason to abide their parliamentary groups. They also have
incentives to preserve member-state powers and prerogatives at the expense of supranational
institutions. Because MEPs have the opportunity to pursue a variety of future offices, their
behavior illuminates the role of institutional variables in the ambition calculus—such as
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electoral institutions and political party characteristics—which do not generally vary within
national legislatures.
We contend that individual, domestic-party, and national level variables shape career op-
portunities available to MEPs and, in turn, their legislative behavior. To test the argument,
we analyze MEPs’ roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999-2004). The
data indicate substantial variability in behavior across both individual MEPs and roll-call
votes. Traditional approaches typically consider only across-legislator variability and ignore
the differences between votes. We demonstrate that across-vote differences can significantly
outweigh between-legislator variation. Ignoring either factor may lead to overconfidence in
the results. Therefore, we use a crossed random-effects model to account for idiosyncrasies
in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes. Substantively,
the results indicate that nationally ambitious MEPs change their voting behavior in antici-
pation of national elections, demonstrating how politicians’ time horizons interact with their
progressive ambition. Further, MEPs planning moves to national office oppose legislation
that expands the purview of supranational institutions, strengthening their expected future
offices and prioritizing future constituencies. The personal ambition of MEPs, therefore, has
a critical effect on European lawmaking and the pace of integration.
1 Political Ambition and the European Parliament
Americanist scholars first argued for political ambition’s important role in conditioning leg-
islator behavior (Schlesinger 1966, Black 1972, Rhode 1979). They contended that “almost
all elected officials have progressive ambition” and hope to move upward to more powerful,
prestigious offices (Copeland 1989, 552). To ensure success, these politicians make pol-
icy choices that satisfy not only their own current constituents, but also potential future
constituents (Hibbing 1986). Politicians anticipating only minor chances to move to more
important offices, however, have little incentive to support legislation specifically targeting
future constituents. Instead, they seek to maximize the influence of their current position by
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climbing the legislature’s internal hierarchy and expanding the policy authority of those in-
stitutions (Hibbing 1999, Squire 1988). In either situation, ambition strongly shapes current
behavior. More recently, scholars have applied these insights to legislatures in other coun-
tries, showing how the institutional environment determines opportunities for advancement
(Samuels 2003, Carey 1996, Epstein et al. 1997, Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies 2000).
The institutional structure of the EP is unique in how it shapes legislative careers. MEPs
are elected in national-level elections to serve a five year-term in the EP. Currently, all mem-
ber states use proportional representation in “European” elections. National-level parties
control nominations to European elections. Candidates in EP elections, therefore, owe alle-
giance to their national party. Further, if a candidate seeks to return to domestic politics,
she will have to seek her party’s nomination in the domestic election. Once elected to the
EP, however, MEPs sit in “groups”. Groups are composed of MEPs from different parties
across member states. The largest group in the 5th EP, the Group of the European Peo-
ple’s Party (EPP-ED), includes members from more than 30 national-level parties. These
groups structure the agenda and determine parliamentary leadership within the EP, much
as political parties do in national-level parliaments.
In general, MEPs have strong incentives to vote with their group leaderships. While
EP groups have little control over electoral nominations, they exert impressive influence
within the EP itself. Group leaders dole out committee assignments, control the speaking
agenda within the parliament, propose bill amendments, and nominate MEPs to the Par-
liamentary Bureau, the body responsible for the EP’s budget and agenda. Groups employ
coordinators—essentially whips—who signal leadership preferences to backbenchers during
floor votes. These coordinators monitor how MEPs vote, potentially allowing them to punish
recalcitrant MEPs. Thus, MEPs have good reason to consistently toe the group line.
Nonetheless, ambition affects the willingness of MEPs to follow their group. MEPs face a
distinct choice of career paths. Descriptive evidence shows that some MEPs desire positions
of power within European institutions while others seek a return to domestic office. In
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the years following the advent of direct election to the EP,2 it was conventional wisdom
that MEPs were strongly motivated by a wish to return to national politics. To test this,
Scarrow (1997) compiled data on pre- and post-EP offices for MEPs elected between 1979
and 1994. She observes that, over time, the EP attracted more legislators interested in a
European career rather than in returning to a domestic office. Stolz (2001) uses similar data
to calculate “exchange rates” between domestic and European levels of legislative office. His
results also detail the existence of a European career track, suggesting that “parliaments on
the regional and European level also function as career arenas in their own right” (2).
We contend that ambition influences MEPs’ legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs cast
their legislative votes to maximize their career expectations. For MEPs focused on advancing
within the EP, the primary constituency is the group leadership. The group leadership
controls their access to resources and prerogatives within the EP. MEPs on national career
arcs, on the other hand, must prioritize home constituency preferences, especially those
bodies responsible for candidate nominations. When group leadership and domestic-level
constituency clash, nationally ambitious MEPs look to the domestic interests to determine
their behavior. MEPs with national ambitions, therefore, are more likely to vote against
their group leaders than MEPs inclined to build a career at the European level.
Further, we expect these differences to be particularly pronounced for issues relating to
the power and authority of European institutions. MEPs who plan to remain in Brussels
benefit from stronger European institutions. By expanding the powers of European institu-
tions, careerist MEPs enhance their own influence and prestige as they work their way up
the EP hierarchy. MEPs hoping for future national office, on the other hand, need to appeal
to domestic parties and voters. They work to advantage member states in terms of policy
and spending and to preserve member sovereignty within the structure of EU institutions.
Therefore, we expect these MEPs to support fewer powers for supranational institutions.
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2 Determining Ambition in the European Parliament
Ambition theory predicts that politicians make decisions based on the potential benefits of
alternative offices and the probability of achieving those positions. If opportunities to move
up the ladder are plentiful or if politicians think they are likely to succeed, politicians behave
in a manner that appeals to future constituents. If there are few opportunities to succeed
or if the probability of achieving those positions is low, politicians focus on satisfying the
policy demands of their current constituents.
For MEPs, therefore, their behavior reflects a calculation about the relative merits of
a career in Brussels against a career in their home country. If an MEP believes that po-
litical opportunities in her home state are few, if those opportunities possess only limited
importance, or if she has little chance of succeeding in attaining them, then a career in Brus-
sels becomes more attractive. In turn, she is more likely to go along with her parliamentary
group and to support policies that enhance the power and influence of European institutions.
On the other hand, MEPs may view domestic office as a more attractive career option, one
that provides more policy influence than serving as an MEP. If the possibility of a domestic
career is relatively high, then MEPs tailor their behavior toward the concerns of national
constituents, being both more willing to defy the EP group leadership and more antagonistic
toward augmenting the power of European institutions.
We argue that individual characteristics, domestic party structures, and national insti-
tutions influence an MEP’s career prospects and, in turn, her legislative behavior.
2.1 Individual Level Variables
Individual characteristics shape electoral fortunes and the possibility of changing careers.
2.1.1 Age
The literature (e.g., Hain 1974) argues that age conditions the effect of ambition on legislative
behavior. In the American context, researchers have found that legislators in the middle of
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their careers are more likely to move on to higher office than either junior or senior lawmakers
(e.g., Brace 1984).
We argue that age influences the career opportunities of MEPs. For young MEPs, the
doors to a successful career either in Brussels or at home are wide open. Young MEPs
looking to move up the European hierarchy can pursue group objectives and participate in
group activities. In contrast, young MEPs may view their time in the EP as way to prove
their worth to their domestic parties by securing EU spending for their member-state and
promoting party objectives at the European level. Indeed, some political parties use service
in the EP as a way to groom up-and-coming talent, providing potential candidates with
valuable legislative experience and an important line on their political resumes.
As MEPs age, however, the opportunities to return to domestic level office diminish.
While serving in the EP for a short time may be a benefit to running for domestic office,
an older MEP is not as attractive to a national party. Working in Brussels can foster
a perception of being out-of-touch with domestic issues. Other potential candidates will
have spent the same time in local and regional offices, building ties to constituents and the
party hierarchy. In fact, some political parties view MEP positions as a last stop for older
politicians rather than a proving ground for up-and-coming candidates.3 As candidates age,
therefore, the possibility of domestic office diminishes and the appeal of a career in the EP
increases. Consequently, we expect middle-aged MEPs will be more likely to toe the group
line and support enhanced powers for European institutions.
Finally, as “old” MEPs close out their careers in Brussels, they face the same sort of
end-game incentives present in any legislature. With retirement on the horizon, it becomes
less important to satisfy group leaders and follow group directives. Instead, the MEP’s own
ideology and immediate personal goals take greater precedence in shaping behavior.
Therefore, a focus on political ambition suggests that the relationship between age and
legislative behavior is curvilinear. MEPs who are neither particularly old nor young are likely
past the point of running for national office, but not so far along in their careers that they do
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not strive to improve their standing within the EP itself. These MEPs should be the most
likely to support group directives and expansions of EU power. MEPs closer to retirement,
however, are relatively immune to group pressure and incentives. These older MEPs are
more likely to defect from group votes. At the same time, we expect that they will continue
to support the strengthening of European institutions simply because they have served in the
EP and may experience the short term benefits from this expansion. Young MEPs face two
potential career paths. The possibility of returning home makes them less likely to follow
group directives or to support empowering EU institutions. Yet some may simply plan for
a career in Brussels. This variation in ambition across junior MEPs attenuates the direct
affect of youth on voting behavior.
2.1.2 Gender
Women MEPs may have different career strategies than their male counterparts. While
many European parliaments, notably in Scandinavia, have made great strides in promoting
the representation of women, women typically have fewer opportunities to attain national-
level offices (IPU 2006). As a result, women may find planning a career in Brussels more
appealing. Consequently, we expect women to defect less from group votes and to support
pro-European legislation.4
2.2 National Party Characteristics
The characteristics of an MEP’s national party shape career opportunities and, in turn, MEP
behavior.
2.2.1 Size of the National Party
The size of a legislator’s national party affects an MEP’s political ambition. On the one hand,
MEPs that are members of large and powerful national parties would wield more legislative
power if they returned home, implying that a career in Europe might be less attractive than
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to MEPs from small national parties. Under this scenario, one might expect MEPs from
large parties to defect from group votes more often.
But while seats in a large party may be more valuable, the probability of serving in them
is often smaller. MEPs from large parties have relatively less hope of returning to national
politics due to extensive within-party competition for candidate nominations. MEPs face
home-party politicians who have built reputations and ties at the local and regional levels.
Compared with these politicians, an MEP—serving in Brussels, away from the domestic
political scene—may have difficulty building the networks of support necessary to earn a
nomination.
For MEPs from smaller national parties, in contrast, seats in the national party may be
less valuable, but serving in the EP may enhance a potential candidate’s stature within the
party. Smaller parties have fewer domestic-level opportunities for potential candidates to
prove themselves. Therefore, small parties may rely more heavily on alternative institutions,
such as the EP, to draw candidates for national positions. Additionally, MEPs from small
national parties already represent some of the most experienced politicians their parties
have. These experienced politicians are likely to be tapped for national service. Therefore,
we expect that MEPs from small national parties will be more likely to defect from group
votes than MEPs from large national parties.
2.2.2 Party’s Presence in Government
Whether the MEP’s party participates in government at the national level affects the MEP’s
calculations. Holding a legislative post in a party that serves in government makes a domestic
level career goal an attractive option. Sitting with a party in power translates to a greater
chance of affecting policy and holding a plum government position. At the same time, if the
party serves in government, it increases the competition for party nominations, making it
less likely that an MEP could successfully jump back into national politics.
The governing status of the MEP’s home party has another influence on MEP behavior.
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When an MEP’s national party serves in government, party ministers participate in the
European Council, the institution where member states bargain directly over policy. Many
bills that come before the EP, therefore, have been vetted by the Council and, as a result,
already have the national governing party’s approval. An MEP who wishes to return home
has incentives to support bills that have been approved by the home party. Indeed, work
on voting in the EP suggests that votes frequently split between “parties represented in the
[European] Council voting one way and parties not voting in the Council voting the other
way” (Hix, Noury & Roland 2006, 509). In this situation, both group and national party
pressures align to encourage the maintenance of group discipline. Therefore, we predict that
MEPs are less likely to defect when their home party serves in the government.
2.3 Member State Characteristics
2.3.1 National Elections
National elections structure the timing of any potential return to domestic office.5 As elec-
tions approach, parties can call MEPs home to serve as candidates. For politicians using the
EP as a stepping-stone to domestic positions, therefore, it is important to please national
parties and domestic constituents in the period leading up to elections. MEPs who are con-
fident that they will enter national office will value the preferences of their expected future
constituents above directions from group leaders. We expect nationally ambitious MEPs to
vote against their groups more frequently in the run-up to national elections, especially on
legislation that expands EU power.
2.3.2 Electoral System
The electoral system conditions the nature of an MEP’s future constituents. MEPs seeking
a return to proportional representation systems have their fate controlled almost entirely
by party leaders. Ambitious politicians who wish to return home to a country with a ma-
joritarian electoral system, on the other hand, must satisfy both their party leaders, who
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will choose whether and where to run them, and local voters, who will decide whether to
vote for them. These MEPs should be especially focused on ensuring member state benefits
in order to win future elections in particular home districts, rather than supporting supra-
national institutions.6 Such MEPs will have frequent reason to vote against their group
leaderships, especially on legislation where EP leaders and national constituencies are likely
to have differences of opinion, such as measures expanding the influence of the EU.
3 Data
To evaluate how political ambition shapes MEPs’ voting behavior, we collected data on each
roll-call vote in the 5th term of the European parliament (1999-2004). We supplemented
the basic voting records with descriptions of the bills considered by the MEPs, information
about the votes themselves, MEP biographies, and data describing the political situations
in the MEPs’ home parties and nations.
3.1 Roll Call Votes and Bill Descriptions
We collected roll call tallies from the Official Journal of the European Union (European
Union 2006). These data consist of yes-votes, no-votes, and abstentions recorded by a total
of 875 MEPs7 participating in each of 5778 roll call votes.
The Official Journal provides identifying bill codes for 5644 of these votes, covering 670
unique pieces of legislation. By cross-referencing these identifiers with the EP’s online Leg-
islative Observatory (OEIL) (European Parliament 2006a) we obtained four-level descriptive
codes of bill issue areas. For the purpose of this project, we focus on only the first level of
the issue coding, grouping the bills into eight issue areas: citizens’ rights, internal market,
agricultural fisheries and economies, economic and social cohesion, economic and monetary
system, common foreign and security policy, justice, and the state and evolution of the
Union. The last classification listed here, the state and evolution of the Union, is key to our
analysis. These “European integration” bills have the potential to expand EU influence over
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member states and should often split group leaderships and nationally ambitious MEPs.
Finally, we augmented our data with Hix, Noury & Roland’s (2006) measures of the
EP group sponsoring the roll call vote and the voting rule—simple or absolute majority—
governing the vote.
3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Group Vote Defections
Our dependent variable, voting defections, is not directly recorded in our data set. To
operationalize this variable, we first constructed a technique for measuring group votes,
those votes which a given EP parliamentary group values highly, and on which it is thus
unlikely to lightly tolerate member deviation. Following Cox & McCubbins (1993, 145–147)
we use group leader activity to assess the importance of votes across groups. When the group
leadership votes in unison, it stands to reason that they expect the rank and file to fall in
line. Therefore, we code each vote at which two thirds of the group leadership attended and
at which at least 90 per cent of the attending leaders voted together as a group vote for
the given group.8 We drop all observations that did not correspond to group votes from the
analysis.9
Coding defections from group votes is not straightforward due to different voting proce-
dures in the EP. On votes that were decided by simple majority we code only those MEPs
that directly voted against their group leaders as defectors, because abstentions have no
impact on the outcome of such votes. When MEPs missed simple majority votes altogether,
we treat their behavior as a missing value. On absolute majority votes, where abstaining
and missing MEPs can affect the outcome, we code MEP behavior as a defection when the
group leaders voted nay and the MEP voted yea, or when the MEP voted nay, abstained,
or was absent from a pro-measure group vote.10
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3.2 MEP Characteristics
We require information describing individual MEP’s career situations to explore the connec-
tions between legislative voting behavior and political ambition. To this end, we collected
biographical data on all 875 MEPs from the EP web site (European Parliament 2006b).
We recorded each MEP’s age, gender, and nationality. In addition, we collected time-
varying11data covering MEPs’ EP group membership and leadership positions, and national
party membership.
3.2.1 MEP Ideology
While ambition theory seeks to explain politicians’ behavior in terms of office payoff, ideology
also influences their decisions. Therefore, it is important to control for MEPs’ underlying
policy preferences when examining the behavioral implications of career ambitions. To do
so, we employ W-NOMINATE procedures to calculate spatial estimates of legislator ideal
points from divisions of roll call votes (Poole & Rosenthal 1985, Poole 2005).12 The first step
in the process was to split the set of roll call votes in the 5th parliament in half randomly.
We then generated two-dimensional W-NOMINATE scores for each MEP on the first half
of the data.13 We used these estimates of MEP ideology from the first half of the data to
fit our model of vote defection using the second half of the data. As a robustness check, we
repeated our analysis, generating W-NOMINATE scores from the second half of the data
and using these scores in models fit to the first half. We present only one half of this process
here, but results are robust across both orders of operation.
Current research indicates that two voting dimensions separate MEPs: the traditional
left-right dimension and a European integration dimension.14 We include both measures of
ideology in our model. First, we include the first-dimension, left-right position. There is no
a priori reason to expect that MEPs from the left will defect at different rates than MEPs
on the right. Thus, we do not expect that this variable will have any consistent effect on
group defections.
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Second, we include each MEP’s NOMINATE score on the second-dimension, support for
integration. Higher values on this dimension indicate stronger support for integration and
expanding the role of supranational institutions. Lower values suggest a preference for main-
taining member-state prerogatives. MEPs who ideologically support European integration
vote for supranational prerogatives at a higher rate than those who prefer greater national
sovereignty. Because group leaders are generally European careerists and support legislation
that expands the power of European institutions, we expect pro-Europe MEPs to vote with
the group leadership more often, especially on bills related to European integration.
Finally, for both dimensions, we include a measure of the absolute value of the distance
between the individual MEP and the score of the median group member. MEPs who are
ideologically distant from their fellow group members are less likely to maintain group dis-
cipline than those MEPs who have preferences that are in line with the leadership. Greater
distance between the MEP and her group median should translate into a greater probability
of defection.
3.3 National and Home Party System Variables
We gathered a number of time-varying indicators of domestic member-state politics, in-
cluding the percentage of legislative seats held by each MEP’s home party, national party
cabinet seat percentages, electoral system (majoritarian or proportional representation), and
the number of days each MEP expected to pass until her next national election. We coded
expected days until national election as the number of days until the election associated
with the end of the nation’s constitutionally mandated election period (CMEP). In cases
with early elections, we coded expected days until national elections in terms of the CMEP
until the date at which the national government announced early elections; at this point we
updated the variable to reflect the early election date set by the government.15
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
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4 Method
The data set is characterized by a complicated hierarchical panel structure. Our unit of
observation is the MEP-vote. The MEP-votes are clustered within EP groups, national
parties, and countries. Complicating matters further, national parties are nested within
countries, but group members are unevenly distributed across parties and countries; that
is, group is crossed with party and nation. Additionally, votes are clustered according to
bill. And, of course, votes and bills are crossed with every other level in the analysis. This
convoluted clustering makes it easy to generate overly optimistic estimates of the strength
of the statistical relationships between variables. It confronts us with difficult choices about
which hierarchical levels to model explicitly and which groupings to control for statistically.
Binary response models (BRMs) are useful tools for analyzing the relationships be-
tween our hypothesized determinants of career ambition and MEP defections (Long 1997).
Nonetheless, a basic BRM cannot adequately model the hierarchical nature of our data with-
out a number of modifications. First, we include a battery of dummy variables to model
the marginal effects of EP group, national party, and country on MEP deviation probability,
effectively dealing with these aspects of the complicated nesting structure in our data by
brute force.
It is more difficult to model the data’s panel structure. We observe the behavior of
each of M MEPs repeatedly across each of V roll call votes (RCVs), with some subset of
the MEPs voting on each vote. It is reasonable to expect substantial variation in defection
tendency across MEPs, even after explicitly modeling determinants of political ambition:
idiosyncratic differences among MEPs influence their voting behavior. Further, there is
likely to be variation in defection rates across roll-call votes: some RCVs are far more
contentious than others. Unfortunately, a simple fixed effects approach—where the analyst
includes dummy variables for each of the M observational units (MEPS) and/or each of the
V observations (RCVs)—will not work in this case. Even if we were to follow standard panel
data conventions and include fixed effects only for units, the sheer number of parameters
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involved would prove an insurmountable obstacle. Perhaps more importantly, fixed effects
BRMs generate biased parameter estimates when V is fixed and M → ∞ (Neyman &
Scott 1948, Lancaster 2000, Hsiao 2003). But, if we do not take these two important sources
of variation into account, we will underestimate the standard errors of our coefficients of
interest(Guo & Zhao 2000).
To overcome this problem, we estimate two-way random effects models (see e.g., Baltagi
2005), otherwise known as crossed random effects models (CREMs). The dataset contains
i = 1, . . . , N observations, with each yi recording the behavior of a single MEP on a given
vote. When the MEP defects on the vote, yi = 1 and it equals zero otherwise. We model
the probability of MEP defection on group votes using probit CREMs of the form
Pr(yi = 1|β, ζ(m)m(i), ζ(v)v(i)) = Φ
[
xiβ + ζ
(m)
m(i) + ζ
(v)
v(i)
]
,
ζ
(m)
m(i) ∼ N(0, σ2m),
ζ
(v)
v(i) ∼ N(0, σ2v)
(1)
where xi is the vector of observed values of the fixed predictors—including group, party, and
country dummies—for observation i, β is a vector of fixed coefficients to estimate, ζ(m) and
ζ(v) are vectors of random intercepts for each of the M MEPs and and V RCVs, respec-
tively,16 σ2m represents the between-MEP variance while σ
2
v corresponds to the between-RCV
variance. This approach uses MEP- and RCV-specific intercepts to capture the unmodeled
role of individual MEP and RCV characteristics in the probability that a particular MEP
defects on a given vote. It assumes that these effects are drawn from a pair of independent
normal distributions. This amounts to the assumption that both MEPs and RCVs represent
independent draws from large populations with fixed within-population variances.
CREMs are especially difficult to estimate when the models contain binary response vari-
ables. Nonetheless, there exist both frequentist maximum likelihood based techniques and
Bayesian approaches to estimating these models. Maximum-likelihood based methods for
CREM estimation fall into two broad categories, quasi-likelihood estimation and exact max-
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imum likelihood estimation, while Bayesian procedures are based on Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods. Rodriguez & Goldman (2001) show that MCMC and exact max-
imum likelihood estimation techniques outperform quasi-likelihood approaches in random
effects BRM estimation and provide evidence that quasi-likelihood estimation underesti-
mates both fixed and random effects when random effects are substantial. Furthermore,
exact maximum likelihood estimation is extremely computationally expensive, rendering its
use impractical with our large dataset. Therefore, we use MCMC methods to estimate our
models. The appendix provides specific estimation details.
5 Results
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 displays the results of three random effects models examining the relationship
between ambition and roll call voting behavior in the EP. Model 1 is a baseline main effects
model and operationalizes age continuously. Models 2 and 3 use a trichotomous operational-
ization of age to investigate the interactions between age and other variables. The estimates
of the MEP and vote random intercept variances, σ2m and σ
2
v , are consistent across all three
models. In each case, the total proportion of the error variance explained by individual
random intercepts is about four per cent, while vote random intercepts explain almost 20
per cent of the variance. These findings reflect the fact that our covariates directly model
a variety of individual factors—such as ideology—while vote-specific factors are largely ab-
sent from the specifications. Table 3 presents deviance information criteria (DICs)17 for our
three fixed covariate specifications, across a variety of possible statistical approaches, in-
cluding basic probit models with no random intercepts, 1-way random intercepts models for
both MEPs and votes, and CREMs. These statistics indicate that the CREMs fit the data
best and that this improvement in fit outweighs the added complexity of these models. The
DICs further emphasize the importance of explicitly modeling variation across both MEPs
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and votes: while the MEP random intercepts significantly improve model fit, including the
vote intercepts generates a more substantial improvement in predictive accuracy. Finally,
the DICs indicate that Model 3 fits the data best, but the difference in fit across the three
specifications is minimal.
[Table 3 about here.]
Overall, the average MEP is unlikely to deviate on the average group-vote. Indeed, only
3.8% of the observations in the dataset represent defections. It is important to note that
the predicted effects scale with the baseline probability of defection for a given MEP-vote.
That is, for an average observation with a low probability of defection, many covariate effects
are substantively modest. Nevertheless, for an MEP-vote where the baseline probability of
defection is high, the predicted effects can be quite substantial, several orders of magnitude
higher than the average.18
We first turn to the results in Model 1. We argue that age is a key determinant of
ambitious behavior in the EP. The effect of age is negative and statistically significant while
the squared term is positive and statistically significant, indicating a U-shaped relationship
between age and vote defection. As hypothesized, the effect of age on vote defection is
curvilinear.
Figure 1 displays Model 1’s average within-sample predictions for the probability of
defection as a function of age.19 Middle-aged MEPs are the least likely to vote against their
leaders with the likelihood of defection minimized in an MEP’s mid-fifties. And, as MEPs get
progressively younger—especially below 40—and older—especially above 65—they become
more likely to deviate on group votes. This finding is consistent with progressive ambition
theory: young MEPs are more likely to deviate from the group in their pursuit of national
careers, middle-aged MEPs maximize their chances in the EU by pleasing the leadership,
and older MEPs serve only themselves.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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The effect of gender is statistically insignificant, indicating little difference in vote deviation—
and perhaps ambition structure—across men and women. Left-right ideology, on the other
hand, is statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly, MEPs with right-wing leanings show
a marked propensity for disregarding their group leaders’ directions even after controlling
for nation, party, EP group, and integration ideology. This may reflect policy differences
across different right parties in the member states—liberal parties and Christian Democratic
parties often have different economic and social policy preferences. The parameter estimate
for integration ideology is negative and significant. As hypothesized, MEPs who value Eu-
ropean integration and who presumably also value careers at the European level, are less
likely to defect on group votes than other MEPs. This effect is substantial: the average pre-
dicted probability of defection for an MEP with an integration ideology score one standard
deviation above the EP mean is between 1.6 and 3.4 times less than that of an MEP with a
score one standard deviation below the mean.20 Finally, as expected, the distance between
an MEP’s ideal point on the left-right dimension and that of her group’s median member
strongly predicts vote deviation. Serving as a group leader also significantly decreases the
probability of defection.
National characteristics also influence MEP vote deviation in a manner consistent with
ambition theory. The coefficient for time until an expected national election is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that as the time until the next election decreases, the
probability of an MEP defection increases. Clearly, the behavioral implications of future
office expectations change over time. Legislators focus their energies on progression within
their current institution when no immediate chance to jump ship presents itself; only as
potential career changes draw near do MEPs position themselves for the future.
The results also support our expectations about the relationship between national-level
party characteristics and MEP behavior. The results indicate a statistically significant neg-
ative relationship between national party size—in terms of percentage of legislative seats—
and MEP defection on group votes. This finding is consistent with the idea that small party
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MEPs represent an attractive pool of candidates to their national party leaders while MEPs
from large parties are operating in a legislative hinterland, under the radar of their national
parties who draw from other sources when promoting candidates. Additionally, MEPs rep-
resenting national parties with strong cabinet presences are less likely to vote against group
leadership than MEPs from opposition parties or parties with only a small stake in govern-
ment.21 This result lends credence to the hypothesis that the agenda-setting power available
to national governments through the European Council may influence the legislative behav-
ior of MEPs: MEPs from national parties that are in government may pursue both national
and supranational career ambitions simultaneously by supporting Council legislation.
Finally, we include three variables to capture the nature of the roll-call vote. The pa-
rameter estimate for European integration bills is positive and significant, indicating that
MEPs are more likely to defect on these bills than on bills in other substantive areas. The
statistically significant coefficients for absolute majority votes indicate that MEPs defect
more on these votes than on those conducted under simple majority rule. This result may
in part stem from our operationalization of defection, which counts missing MEPs as defec-
tors on absolute majority votes but not on simple ones. Absolute majority votes are also
generally employed for more substantial pieces of legislation, such as bills operating under
the codecision procedure. MEPs defecting for reasons of ambition have reason to focus their
behavior around especially important and visible votes. Lastly, the models indicate that
MEPs are more likely to deviate on roll call votes called by their own groups than on those
requested by other factions. This result is somewhat surprising, but it may indicate that EP
group leaders call RCVs precisely when they expect dissent in the rank and file.
Model 2 extends the analysis of age in Model 1 to examine how an ambitious politician’s
age interacts with the institutional and voting environment when influencing group vote
defection. Model 2 uses dummy variables for young and old MEPs, instead of continuous
operationalizations of age and its square, to aid in the estimation and interpretation of these
age interactions. Based on the results in Model 1, we classify MEPs as young when they are
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40 years old or less and old when they are 65 or greater.22 We interact the age dummies with
national election time and European integration bills. The estimates for the main effects
remain similar to those in Model 1.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 presents the overall relationship between age, bill type, time until national
election, and vote defection graphically, in terms of average predicted probabilities from
Model 2. The solid lines in Figure 2 represent middle-aged MEPs, the dashed lines correspond
to the defection probabilities of younger MEPs, and the dotted lines display predictions for
older MEPs. The gray lines describe predicted behavior when MEPs vote on European
integration bills, while black lines predict defections on all other bills.
The results indicate that young MEPs are responsive to variations in bill type and na-
tional election timing. The average young MEP’s predicted probability of defection is be-
tween 0.1 and 1.7 points higher for European integration bills than others, when elections
are 870 days away (the dataset mean). For a young MEP with a high baseline defection
rate, the probability of defecting on a European integration bill is as much as 14 points
higher than on a non-integration bill. For middle-aged and older MEPs, the type of bill has
substantially smaller predicted impacts.
The results also predict that a young MEP is between 1.1 and 1.9 times as likely to
defect on a group vote right before a national election than three-and-a-half years before an
election. Again, the national election proximity effects for middle-aged and older MEPs are
more modest. For middle-aged MEPs, national election proximity has a slight, statistically
significant effect on the probability of defection, but old MEPs do not respond to national
election timing.
For all types of bills, therefore, young MEPs time their defections, focusing their de-
viations to coincide with national elections. Further, younger MEPs defect more often on
European integration bills. The predicted defection rate is significantly higher for integration
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bills than non-integration bills. That is, young MEPs focus their vote defections on exactly
those pieces of legislation that are most likely to erode the powers of national political offices
and displease national constituents and party functionaries.
Our predictions about when and how older MEPs defect also bear fruit. Unlike their
younger counterparts, old MEPs have little incentive to consider the timing of national
elections when pursuing their career goals. The predicted probability of defection for an
older MEP does not differ significantly across expected national election times. On the other
hand, the hypothesis that old MEPs will jealously guard the power of EU institutions because
they are likely to remain in them for the rest of their careers is not so clearly supported by
the model’s results. Unlike their younger colleagues, old MEPs defect somewhat less on
integration bills, but those differences are not statistically significant.
Figure 3 breaks down the information in Figure 2 via pairwise comparisons, allowing
us to evaluate the interactive influence of age, bill type, and national election timing on
vote defection more precisely. The solid lines in Figure 3 are the point estimates of the
average probability of defection presented in Figure 2 while the dashed lines are 95% credible
intervals. Black lines represent middle-aged MEPs, gray lines correspond to young MEPs,
and light gray lines depict older MEPs’ predicted behavior. The top row of panels depict
average predicted probabilities for votes on European integration bills while the bottom set
of panels represent votes on other bills.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Panels a and b show that young MEPs are significantly more likely to defect on integration-
focused votes than both middle-aged and older MEPs, especially as national elections near.
On non-integration bills, however, voting behavior across the age cohorts is different. While
panel d indicates the probability of defection on non-integration bills differs significantly be-
tween young and middle-aged MEPs throughout their national election cycles, panel e shows
that young and old MEPs differ in their predicted defections only as elections approach.
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Panels c and f compare middle-age and old MEPs. On integration bills (panel c), the
predicted defection rates for middle-age and old MEPS is statistically indistinguishable. For
non-integration bills (panel f), however, old MEPs are significantly more likely to defect
when elections are not imminent.
These results imply that younger and middle-aged MEPs drive the integration interaction
effects in Model 2. Younger MEPs react strongly to both bill type and election timing.
Similarly, middle-aged MEPs react in a statistically significant manner to both election
timing and bill type, but at lower substantive levels. This finding is consistent with the
possibility that a relatively small number of middle-aged MEPs still covet national office.
Older MEPs, on the other hand, cruise along at a steady predicted probability of defection,
ignoring integration bills in addition to election timing.
Finally, Model 3 extends Model 2 to investigate the impact of electoral system on MEP
voting. Again, the estimates for the main effects remain similar across models. We hypoth-
esized that MEPs from nations holding majoritarian elections would exhibit a greater sensi-
tivity to national prerogatives than their counterparts in proportional representation (PR)
systems, especially on legislation dealing with EU expansion. The statistically significant
and positive coefficients for majoritarianism and the interaction between majoritarianism
and European integration bills in Model 3 support this hypothesis. This effect is also sub-
stantively significant; on European integration votes, a majoritarian MEP is between 1.8
and 6.3 times more likely to defect than an MEP from a PR or mixed system, on average.
6 Conclusion
By taking advantage of the unique institutional structure of the EP, we are able to identify
how different career paths shape behavior while holding the legislative agenda and macro-
political conditions constant. Our results support the primary pillar of ambition theory:
MEPs are forward-looking. Young MEPs have the largest potential to return to national
politics and are more likely than their colleagues to contravene the dictates of EP group
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leaders. But the relationship between ambition and behavior is not simply a function of
a politician’s stage in life; the political opportunity structure also shapes how MEPs vote.
National election timing, size and governing status of the national party, and the electoral
system all shape incentives to defect from group votes. Perhaps most importantly, ambitious
MEPs position themselves for national careers in a focused manner, breaking with EP leaders
on legislation that determines the relative strengths of EU and national institutions. That
is, their career goals lead them to work to the detriment of their current office since they
believe that the resulting long-run distribution of power will benefit them more.
Substantively, the results imply a link between the candidate nomination strategies of
national-level parties and the pace of integration in the EU. Parties have two basic nomi-
nation choices for European elections. First, they can use European elections as a dumping
ground for candidates who have little future in national politics. For instance, they can
nominate older politicians to the EP, rewarding them with “retirement” positions. Or par-
ties can try to kick difficult and undisciplined national-level politicians upstairs to the EP.
As MEPs, however, these politicians have little incentive to preserve member state powers
and will instead support increased authority for supranational institutions. Alternatively,
parties can use European elections as a proving ground for young politicians. These parties
take the work of the EP seriously and value service there as an important stepping-stone to
a national career. Ironically, it is the MEPs from these parties who have the most incentive
to weaken Europe’s supranational institutions in favor of member state prerogatives. As
service in the EP becomes more useful for many nationally-ambitious politicians, therefore,
pressure to expand the powers of European institutions generally, and the EP specifically,
will decrease. Developing a fuller theory of candidate nomination strategies and empirically
tracing the careers of individual MEPs will help identify the causal relationships between
progressive ambition, legislative behavior, and European integration.
Further, ambition politics within the EP may shape interactions between EU institutions.
Our results indicate that incentives for defection vary according to the timing of national-
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level elections. As a national election draws near, MEPs from that member state are more
likely to defect from their group. This raises the possibility of agenda manipulation by the
Commission, which initiates all European legislation, and the Council, the institution for
direct member state bargaining. The Commission and the Council may attempt to time the
delivery of legislative bills to the EP to take advantage of MEP’s incentives. The Commission
may delay pro-integration legislation until just after a national election in a key member-
state as a way to insure the most support. Alternatively, the Council might send pro-member
state bills to the EP as national elections approach. Our results, therefore, suggest that it
might be possible to link episodes of conflict between the Commission and the Council to
the timing of national elections.
Finally, the results have broader implications for the study of legislative behavior. From
a theoretical perspective, we highlight the importance of political ambition in determining
behavior. Other research emphasizes the importance of ideology in shaping vote choice,
relying on the same voting records to generate estimates of legislators’ ideal points (Hix,
Noury & Roland 2006). Yet, in isolation, neither of these factors can adequately explain
legislative voting. Just as we incorporated ideology in our model of political ambition,
so too must one explicitly model ambition when extracting ideological content from votes.
Disentangling the influence of ideology and ambition represents a challenge not only for the
study of the EP, but for legislative studies more generally. By doing so, we may very well
reveal very different maps of the ideological space of legislative behavior.
Appendix
Bayesian CREM estimation requires the analyst to specify prior probability distributions for
the model parameters β, σ2m, and σ
2
v in Equation 1. Following Browne & Draper (2000) and
Browne, Goldstein & Rabash (2001), we adopt a diffuse multivariate normal prior for the
p fixed effects, β ∼ Np(µ0,Σ0), where µ0 = 0 and Σ0 = 106I. Similarly, we select scaled
inverse χ2 priors for the variance terms, σ2m ∼ SIχ2(vm, s2m) and σ2v ∼ SIχ2(vv, s2v), where
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vm = vv = 2 · 10−3 and s2m = s2v = 1. By choosing these prior distributions we indicate that
we are uncertain about β and assume that the random intercepts are all close to zero, a
priori.
Rabash & Browne (In Press) describe a Gibbs sampling algorithm for estimating a CREM
with continuous responses. We take advantage of the latent variable interpretation of binary
regression and a data augmentation (Tanner & Wong 1987) technique introduced by Albert
& Chib (1993) to convert this continuous response estimation algorithm into one that can
estimate the BRM in Equation 1. This algorithm treats the random intercepts ζ(m) and ζ(v)
as latent variables and introduces a new vector of latent variables z, such that
zi = xiβ + ζ
(m)
m(i) + ζ
(v)
v(i) + ²i (2)
where we assume each independent and identically distributed ²i ∼ N(0, 1) and
yi =

0 if zi ≤ 0
1 if zi > 0.
(3)
This is the familiar latent variable specification of the probit BRM and implies that
Pr(yi = 1|β, ζ(m)m(i), ζ(v)v(i)) = Φ
[
xiβ + ζ
(m)
m(i) + ζ
(v)
v(i)
]
or, in other words, the latent variable specification in equations 2 and 3 is equivalent to
the binary response CREM described by Equation 1. This parameterization of the model in
Equation 1 suggests a Gibbs sampling algorithm23 that incorporates the following steps in
each iteration (n
(c)
k is the number of observations in the kth unit of classification c, nm is the
number of MEPs and nv is the number of votes):
1. Simulate β from f(β|z, σ2m, σ2v , ζ(m), ζ(v)) ∼ Np(βˆ, Dˆ), where
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• Dˆ = [X′X+Σ−10 ]−1
• βˆ = Dˆ
[∑N
i=1 x
′
idi +Σ
−1
0 µ0
]
• di = zi − ζ(m)m(i) − ζ(v)v(i)
2. Simulate each ζ
(m)
k from f(ζ
(m)
k |z,β, σ2m, σ2v , ζ(v)) ∼ N(µˆ(m)k , Dˆ(m)k ), where
• Dˆ(m)k =
[
n
(m)
k +
1
σ2m
]−1
• µˆ(m)k = Dˆ(m)k
[∑
i s.t m(i)=k
(
zi − xiβ − ζ(v)v(i)
)]
3. Simulate each ζ
(v)
k from f(ζ
(v)
k |z,β, σ2m, σ2v , ζ(m)) ∼ N(µˆ(v)k , Dˆ(v)k ), where
• Dˆ(v)k =
[
n
(v)
k +
1
σ2v
]−1
• µˆ(v)k = Dˆ(v)k
[∑
i s.t v(i)=k
(
zi − xiβ − ζ(m)m(i)
)]
4. Simulate σ2m from f
(
1
σ2m
|z,β, σ2v , ζ(m), ζ(v)
)
∼ Gamma
[
nm+vm
2
, 1
2
∑nm
j=1(ζ
(m)
j )
2 + vms
2
m
]
5. Simulate σ2v from f
(
1
σ2v
|z,β, σ2m, ζ(m), ζ(v)
)
∼ Gamma
[
nv+vv
2
, 1
2
∑nv
j=1(ζ
(v)
j )
2 + vvs
2
v
]
6. Simulate each zi from the truncated normal distributions
f(zi|yi,β, σ2m, σ2v , ζ(m)m(i), ζ(v)v(i)) ∼

N(0,∞)(xiβ + ζ
(m)
m(i) + ζ
(v)
v(i)) if yi = 1
N(−∞,0)(xiβ + ζ
(m)
m(i) + ζ
(v)
v(i)) if yi = 0
This algorithm directly simulates from the posterior distributions of not only the fixed coef-
ficients and random effects variances but also from the posteriors of all three sets of latent
variables, allowing the analyst to work with the estimated posterior distributions of the ran-
dom intercepts and to perform residual analysis based on z using familiar techniques from
linear regression modeling.
In our analysis of MEP voting behavior, we estimated each model by running the Gibbs
sampler for 55,000 iterations, discarding the first 5,000 iterations and retaining every 50th
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iteration for a final posterior sample of 1,000 observations. Standard diagnostic tests gen-
erated results consistent with chain convergence for all three models and results are robust
to variation in chain starting values and prior specification. In addition, penalized quasi-
likelihood estimates of logistic versions of these models produce substantively similar results
to the MCMC probit approach. We performed all MCMC computation in C++ using the
Scythe Statistical Library (Pemstein, Quinn & Martin 2007).
Notes
1Over-time analysis provides one technique for overcoming this shortcoming, and such
research has helped to explain phenomena like the rise of careerism in American politics
(Brady, Buckley & Rivers 1999).
2The EP was established in 1957. Direct election to the EP, however, commenced only
in 1979. Before this it was composed of appointed national delegations.
3This was particularly true prior to the advent of the Codecision procedure. Codecision,
introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, greatly increased the powers of the EP
and with it the prestige and importance of EP positions.
4Although the use of quota systems at the party or national levels create more slots for
women in domestic politics, it is not clear that those opportunities will affect the legislative
behavior of women MEPs. Electoral quotas expand the demand for women candidates, while
the pool of “quality” women candidates (i.e., those with some sort of experience holding
political office) is likely to be small. Therefore, parties may choose women as candidates
even if those women have not done as much to serve the interests of the party. Women
MEPs interested in a career in domestic politics, therefore, do not necessarily face the same
behavioral incentives as male MEPs with the same ambitions.
5National elections provide important opportunities to return to national politics for
MEPs from all member states. In some member states, local or regional elections may also
provide the possibility of domestic office. Nonetheless, because the importance of these
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local and regional opportunities varies considerably across member-states, we leave a direct
analysis of their impact to future research.
6Scholl (1986) argued a similar logic and showed that British MEPs coming from majori-
tarian European Parliament districts (before the elimination of those districts in the 1990s)
were markedly more constituency and nationally oriented than their PR counterparts.
7Although 875 MEPs served in the EP over the course of the 5th term, only 626 members
were active at any single given point in time. That is, the EP contains 626 members but
the composition of the parliament changed over the course of the 5th term, with 875 MEPs
serving in total. We include in the analysis only MEPs representing those countries that
were EU members at the beginning of the 5th term: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and The United Kingdom.
8The leadership of a group in the 5th EP can contain as many as 16 individuals.
9Because a given vote can be a group vote for one or two groups but not for others, there
are many votes that only influence our results through the actions of a subset of the active
MEPs.
10Choosing the correct form of the deviation variable was difficult. Missing MEPs, while
often simply on vacation or in the restroom, may skip votes in a strategic fashion. We repli-
cated the substantive results of our analysis across four versions of the dependent variable:
in addition to the defection variable described in the text we tried coding all missing MEPs
as defectors, all missing MEPs as missing values, and missing MEPs on simple majority
votes as non-defectors.
11All time varying data is at day resolution.
12By contrast, other studies use expert placements (e.g. Marks, Wilson & Ray 2002, Ray
1999) or party manifestos data (Gabel & Hix 2002, Pennings 2002) to place parties and
MEPs on various policy dimensions.
13Votes were only incorporated into NOMINATE scores where at least 2.5 per cent of
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voters were in the minority and MEPs were included only if they recorded a minimum of 25
votes
14Hix (2001) and Hix, Noury & Roland (2006) fit models predicting these two primary
NOMINATE dimensions with expert evaluations of issue positions and find that “the second
dimension is strongly related to the EU integration dimension [of expert evaluations].”
15We obtained election and election announcement dates from the European Journal of
Political Research and Electoral Studies.
16The functionsm(·) and v(·) subscripting the random intercept components in Equation 1
map each observation i to its respective MEP and VOTE intercepts. Browne, Goldstein &
Rabash (2001) introduce this notation.
17The DIC (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin & van der Linde 2002) is a goodness of fit statistic
that, like the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
balances a model’s fit to data with its complexity, in terms of number of parameters. The
DIC is specifically designed for comparing hierarchical models and is especially well suited
to Bayesian MCMC models.
18The models generate numerous in-sample predictions of the probability of defection in
excess of 0.5.
19To compute average within-sample predicted probabilities we calculate the predicted
probability of defection for each observation in the dataset and then average the predictions.
This produces a representative estimate of predicted effects in contrast to choosing a single
“representative” MEP-vote or setting covariates at their means. Because of the size of our
dataset, we performed this operation on a random sub-sample of 1000 MEP-votes from the
dataset, rather than on all of the data.
20Effect ranges are based on 95% credible intervals around average predicted probabilities.
21Although the coefficient for party cabinet percentage only reaches conventional levels
of statistical significance in Model 2, Model 1 estimates that the coefficient is negative
with probability 0.88, while the corresponding probability is 0.87 in Model 3. Therefore,
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the negative relationship between party cabinet percentage and vote defection is generally
supported across all three models.
22MEPs under 40 represent approximately 12% of the total while those over 65 include
about 5% of the population. We experimented with age cutoffs at 35 and 60 with similar
results.
23Gibbs samplers iteratively sample from the posterior distributions of subsets of the
model parameters conditional on current simulated values of the remaining parameters—a
process that eventually converges to the model parameters’ joint posterior distribution. For
an introduction to Gibbs samplers, and MCMC in general, see Gelman, Carlin, Stern &
Rubin (2004) or Gill (2002).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Age 53.07 9.21 23.12 79.31
Gender 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Left-Right Ideology −0.08 0.48 −0.81 0.82
Integration Ideology 0.26 0.53 −1.00 1.00
Left-Right Distance 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.85
Integration Distance 0.14 0.21 0.00 1.31
Group Leader 0.07 0.36 0.00 1.00
Natn’l Election Time 860.99 462.73 1.00 1824.00
Majoritarian 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Natn’l Party Seat % 26.22 15.63 0.00 63.30
Natn’l Party Cabinet % 24.02 36.14 0.00 100.00
Integration Bill 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Absolute Majority 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Group RCV Sponsor 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
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Table 2: Determinants of Vote Defection in the European Parliament, 5th Term
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Agea -0.3497 (0.0646)∗∗
Age Squared 0.0325 (0.0062)∗∗
Youngb 0.1513 (0.0348)∗∗ 0.1496 (0.0322)∗∗
Oldc 0.0419 (0.0308) 0.0369 (0.0304)
Gender -0.0022 (0.0207) -0.0036 (0.0202) -0.0016 (0.0202)
Left-Right Ideology 0.4053 (0.1418)∗∗ 0.4345 (0.1471)∗∗ 0.4298 (0.1542)∗∗
Integration Ideology -0.4841 (0.1105)∗∗ -0.4872 (0.1133)∗∗ -0.4834 (0.1105)∗∗
Left-Right Distance 1.0085 (0.2119)∗∗ 0.9698 (0.2176)∗∗ 0.9522 (0.2116)∗∗
Integration Distance 0.0093 (0.1374) 0.0203 (0.1382) 0.0186 (0.1399)
Group Leader -0.4096 (0.0298)∗∗ -0.4133 (0.0299)∗∗ -0.4170 (0.0293)∗∗
Natn’l Election Timed -0.0096 (0.0008)∗∗ -0.0092 (0.0009)∗∗ -0.0087 (0.0009)∗∗
Majoritarian 0.5740 (0.2151)∗∗
Natn’l Party Seat % -0.0043 (0.0014)∗∗ -0.0041 (0.0015)∗∗ -0.0045 (0.0015)∗∗
Natn’l Party Cabinet % -0.0005 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0003)∗ -0.0019 (0.0008)
Integration Bill 0.0715 (0.0238)∗∗ 0.0768 (0.0219)∗∗ -0.0019 (0.0245)
Absolute Majority 0.9995 (0.0268)∗∗ 1.0013 (0.0260)∗∗ 1.0017 (0.0279)∗∗
Group RCV Sponsor 0.0585 (0.0112)∗∗ 0.0596 (0.0107)∗∗ 0.0598 (0.0120)∗∗
Young × Natn’l Election Time -0.0077 (0.0029)∗∗ -0.0076 (0.0028)∗∗
Young × Integration Bill 0.0470 (0.0282)∗ 0.0385 (0.0284)
Old × Natn’l Election Time 0.0016 (0.0026) 0.0015 (0.0025)
Old × Integration Bill -0.0906 (0.0319)∗∗ -0.0569 (0.0312)∗
Majoritarian × Bill Type 8 0.2276 (0.0173)∗∗
σ2m 0.0533 (0.0036) 0.0533 (0.0038) 0.0531 (0.0036)
σ2v 0.2456 (0.0086) 0.2454 (0.0086) 0.2452 (0.0087)
We present estimated posterior means and, in parentheses, standard deviations. All models
include full batteries of fixed effects for EP group, nation, and national party (when more than
one MEP represented that party in the 5th EP) and an intercept term (not shown). M = 575;
V = 2124; N = 621627.
∗ The 90% Bayesian credible interval for this coefficient excludes zero.
∗∗ The 95% Bayesian credible interval for this coefficient excludes zero.
a Age is scaled to tens of years.
b Young MEPs are 40 years old or less.
c Old MEPs are 65 years old or more.
d Time until national election is scaled to hundreds of days.
37
Table 3: Deviance Information Criteria Across Specifications
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
No Random Effects 180,136 180,110 179,941
MEP Random Effects Only 176,763 176,740 176,567
Vote Random Effects Only 159,011 159,004 158,845
Crossed Random Effects 155,353 155,349 155,190
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Figure 1: Average Predicted Probability of Defection as a Function of Age
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Figure 2: Average Predicted Probability of Defection as a Function of Age, Bill Type, and
Proximity of National Elections
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Figure 3: Average Predicted Probability of Defection as a Function of Age, Bill Type, and
Proximity of National Elections: Pairwise Comparisons with 95% Credible Intervals
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